Cleveland Browns News and Notes
August 19, 2010Columbus Clippers Playoff Update
August 19, 2010I’ve been grilled by some really smart people about my belief that Michael Brantley should be starting everyday for this team for the foreseeable future—preferably at the top of the lineup. These smart people make good points: Brantley’s line this season is not lead-off material; his bat isn’t quite ready for the big leagues; he needs more seasoning, so we might as well delay his service time in Columbus while he gets it. These are, in my mind, totally legitimate points that some highly respected Tribe Scribes have suggested.
But I’m kinda dumb and obstinate, so I’m going to stick to my guns, and suggest that when the Indians break camp next spring, Michael Brantley, Grady Sizemore, and Shin-Soo Choo should be our three starting outfielders. Further, I would suggest that Brantley leadoff for the rest of this season, and probably to start next season as well. I’ll take my lumps for that if I turn out to be wrong, but like I’ve said many times before: I believe in his ability to get on base, and I take some comfort from his good play since rejoining the team earlier this month. So for the purposes of what I’m going to do today, I will project Brantley as a .290/.360/.410 (.770 OPS) hitter. That may be wildly optimistic. So be it. The site is called Waiting For Next Year, after all. We live on freaking optimism.
And all of this brings us to the issue of where Brantley should play. In my opinion, he’s a completely viable centerfielder, and he might be too valuable as a defender to stick him in a corner spot. Further, his bat just won’t play well enough in left. After all, a leftfielder with a .770 OPS is below average, but for a centerfielder who plays good defense? A .770 OPS would be great. Let’s take a look at some numbers to prove my point. Here is the AL OPS leaderboard for qualifying leftfielders this season:
Name | OPS |
Josh Hamilton | 1.041 |
Delmon Young | 0.870 |
Carl Crawford | 0.841 |
Brennan Boesch | 0.791 |
Johnny Damon | 0.784 |
Austin Kearns | 0.782 |
Fred Lewis | 0.777 |
Scott Podsednik | 0.753 |
Juan Pierre | 0.649 |
Obviously, my projection for Brantley would be in the neighborhood of Scott Podsednik and Fred Lewis—well below average for a starting left fielder.
Now let’s look at the AL centerfielders:
Name | OPS |
Torii Hunter | 0.861 |
Vernon Wells | 0.825 |
Alex Rios | 0.811 |
Adam Jones | 0.771 |
Brett Gardner | 0.770 |
Austin Jackson | 0.760 |
B.J. Upton | 0.741 |
Denard Span | 0.694 |
Rajai Davis | 0.692 |
Franklin Gutierrez | 0.685 |
As long as Brantley can play centerfield, his numbers slot in much better there. He’d be slightly above average offensively with a .770 OPS, behind only three of the highest paid outfielders in the game.
But this would obviously mean moving Grady to left, and that’s not necessarily a move he’d be eager to make. Let’s discuss.
For one thing, like any professional athlete, Grady probably has some sense of ego about playing centerfield: it’s one of the more glorified defensive positions in the game, and Grady has played it wonderfully over the course of his career. His range is phenomenal, as are his instincts. Sure, Grady never had much of an arm, but for several years he received glowing marks from all the defensive metrics as well as the scouts. So long as his knee tests out well next Spring, Grady might not feel comfortable giving his position to a 23 year old kid.
But there’s more than just ego at work—there’s the issue of money and marketability, and a move to leftfield could cost Grady considerably. To illustrate this, we’re going to get into some of the nuts and bolts of a stat we’ve talked about before: Wins Above Replacement or WAR.
You’ll remember that for a position player, WAR has two components: his runs contributed offensively (measured by wOBA) and his runs saved on defense (measured usually with UZR). You add up all the runs a player contributes in these two ways, and divide by 10 (since 10 runs is roughly equal to a win), and tada! You have how many more wins a player contributed to his team over the course of a year than a AAA guy would have. It’s a nifty tool for player evaluations and comparisons.
But there’s more to the defensive component of WAR than just “runs saved” with your glove. After all, it’s harder to save runs at a more difficult position. This notion may sound odd, but think of it this way: is it harder to replace the defense of an average SS or an average 1B? It’s obviously harder to find an average SS; players who can play 1B grow on trees, but shortstops (and centerfielders) can be harder to find. It’s why the Mariners sunk so much money into Franklin Gutierrez this offseason even though he can’t hit. That defense is hard to replace.
To solve this problem, there is a step in the calculation of a player’s WAR that adjusts for the difficulty of the position he plays (and thus, how hard it would be to replace him). Here’s a brief writeup on this adjustment if you’re interested, but the positional adjustments look something like this:
C | +12.5 runs |
SS | +7.5 runs |
2B | +2.5 runs |
3B | +2.5 runs |
CF | +2.5 runs |
LF | -7.5 runs |
RF | -7.5 runs |
1B | -12.5 runs |
DH | -17.5 runs |
Again, this looks complicated, but let’s think of it this way: DH’s don’t make any plays on defense, so their UZRs are all zero (or average compared to other DH’s). Does that mean that their defensive contribution is the same as a league-average shortstop whose UZR is also zero? (Remember: a zero UZR means that you are average compared to others at your position.) Obviously not, because the DH brought no defensive value to the club while the shortstop brought significant value by playing at a league-average rate—even though they both had a zero UZR rating!
To negotiate this problem, we adjust each player’s defensive contribution using the scale above. So for our DH/SS problem, we would add 7.5 runs to the shortstop’s final defensive tally while subtracting 17.5 runs from the DH’s tally. This step is crucial when differentiating (and establishing) the value of playing different positions on the field.
So look again at the difference between centerfield and leftfield: it’s a difference of 10 runs—from a positive 2.5 run adjustment for a CFer to negative 7.5 run adjustment for a LFer. And remember, 10 runs equals a win.
So what does all this mean for Grady Sizemore, and a potential shift from center to left? Let’s look at the WAR figures he’s put up over his career in centerfield to give a gauge of his historical production:
Year | WAR |
2005 | 5.4 |
2006 | 7.3 |
2007 | 5.7 |
2008 | 7.1 |
2009 | 1.9 |
In 2006 Grady led the American League with 7.3 wins above replacement; his closest competitors were Derek Jeter and Travis Hafner (!) who both posted 6.2 WAR that season. In 2008, Grady again led the AL in WAR with his 7.1, followed by Dustin Pedroia (AL MVP) at 6.6. You can see why some people thought Grady had a chance to win an MVP at some point. But so much of Grady’s value was attributable to his great defense, and the fact that that great defense came while playing centerfield (and its consequent positive positional adjustment).
What if those seasons had taken place in leftfield rather than center? It’s tempting to just subtract 10 runs—or one win—from his WAR, and decrease all those numbers by one (since the positional adjustments differ by 10 runs).
But it might be even more than that.
Consider: if Grady plays left, not only would he be hurt by the ten-run positional adjustment, but he’d also be hurt by the fact that there is a smaller spread between the best LFer and the worst. Think about it. There’s less ground to cover in leftfield, and therefore Grady’s biggest asset—his range—wouldn’t be fully exploited, and his worst liability—his arm—would show up even more. In effect, there would be fewer chances for him to separate himself from the average leftfielder defensively.
So for the sake of argument, let’s say that a move to left would cost Grady around fifteen runs: 10 from the positional adjustment and five from the smaller spread in talent. That would reduce his WAR by roughly 1.5. Let’s take a look at those seasons again:
YEAR | “ADJUSTED” LF WAR |
2005 | 3.9 |
2006 | 5.8 |
2007 | 4.2 |
2008 | 5.6 |
Those are still great numbers, but obviously they wouldn’t be as valuable. But value is a funny term: who would be doing the valuing in this case?
I know what you’re thinking: none of this matters to us as Indians’ fans. So long as Brantley can play centerfield as well as Grady can, the move is all academic, since Brantley will pick up any value that Grady loses in the switch.
And guess what? You’re right. Assuming that neither Brantley nor Sizemore is appreciably better than the other in centerfield (a position to which I’m starting to warm, considering Grady’s bum knee and Brantley’s stronger arm), who plays where is largely inconsequential to the number of games the Indians will win next season.
So why bother with this exercise?
Here’s where it gets interesting. Guess who looks at WAR (along with all the other stats that assess a player’s total value/contribution to his team)? Agents use them. Front offices use them. They use them to determine how much a player should make in arbitration. They use them to make contract proposals. In short, both agents and front offices are in the business of using numbers to support their claims about a player. And WAR certainly comes into those discussions.
So, brilliant readers, you’re right. Assuming similar defensive skill from both guys, it won’t matter in the win-loss column which guy plays where.
But it will matter when it comes to valuing those players. Whose value would we like to inflate more (by playing him in center)? Or more precisely, whose value would the team less want to inflate, and stick in left?
I don’t really know the answer to this. On the one hand, it would be nice to move Grady to left to “lower” his value on the free agent market in an attempt to re-sign him. On the other hand, Brantley will obviously be a big part of this team moving forward, so we might want to lower his value by putting him in left and make him appear less valuable as he approaches his arbitration years.
Obviously, I want the team to make the best baseball decision: if Grady is a better centerfielder than Brantley, then I want him there. If the opposite is true, then I want Brantley. But if they’re a wash defensively, I’m not sure what I’d prefer, considering that whoever plays center will have his value inflated on the FA market.
I dunno. You guys got any grudges you’d like to settle against either of these guys? Because whoever ends up in left is probably a completely viable centerfielder who’s going to lose some money in this decision.
12 Comments
Solidarity, brother!
very interesting, with the WAR twist. Make the best baseball decision, yes. But there’s a lot of time between now and when this decision gets made. Lots can happen… let’s wait and see, the answer may be made for us.
as far as grady, i dont buy into the lets put him in left to decrease his free agency value. would he want to resign with a team if he’s not happy playing left?
My biggest concern (listed in my link above) is seeing what Grady’s range looks like coming off of MAJOR (and, it’s MAJOR) knee surgery. My initial assumption (and that’s all it is, really) is that at the outset Brantley’s going to have better range due simply to health more than anything else. That’s not to say Grady will be slow; he most likely won’t. But will he still be as fast as he was, and as fast as Brantley? Probably not, at least at first.
Grady should play CF, shaded toward right and let Brantley play left. Brant will handle balls in the corner and potential home plate throws better. Let Grady test his max range unless he’s limited from the knee, at which point Brantley can move over. Either way the 3 starting OFs we wil have will be a disgusting combo – with all that range in all 3 of those guys, the outfield is going to look a -lot- smaller to hitters trying to drop one in.
Great post. Although I don’t really see it happening.
I think Grady will stay in center. If he comes back and has a decent year there is a decent chance we could move him in a year or two – considering we’d already have his replacement in CF (Brantley or Washington) and options for LF (Weglarz or any other number of hitters coming up – Kipnis and Phelps both being 2B means one may have to move).
Jon:
Appreciate your dedication to statistical analysis and your willingness to explain it length, but the bottom line is that most of your analysis is based on a blind guess as to Brantley’s output next year. While I appreciate your optimism, I’ll eat my hat if he slugs .410 next year.
Very good article, and something I hadn’t really thought of. Couple thoughts though:
1. If Grady is still extremely capable of playing a great CF, but still not more valuable than Brantley is there, then from strictly a baseball perspective, we should trade him to a team that will use him in CF and give us equal value for him as a CF. (I know this is initially improbable because of all the uncertainty surrounding his production, and even long term it would have huge public perception effects. I am not really suggesting this, only sharing a thought.)
2. Back to the arbitration issue though. Don’t you think that any good agent would be doing the exact same math you just did (even more in depth) and demanding that his player be paid for his full value, regardless of where the Indians are actually using him?
The whole point of WAR is to give us a metric to analyze/compare an individuals contributions to the team without all the outside influences that he can’t control. While we use WAR to try to determine what Masterson would have been able to produce with a better defense behind him, or if he had been a little less “unlucky”, maybe we will be discussing what Grady’s true value could have been if he had been played at his best position.
I don’t feel like WAR really has anything to do with marketability either, so I feel like money and marketability should be virtually unchanged by this potential move.
@Mike
This analysis is not based on Brantley’s ability to slug .410, only his ability to have a spot on our Opening Day line up next year, which I would say is almost a certainty. Even if his production wanes for the rest of the season, I would be willing to bet the Indians will want to give the 23 yr old a chance to develop. Justified or not, the FO wants to give Brantley and LaPorta every chance to succeed for marketing purposes as well.
If the Indians play Sizemore in LF, and other teams believe he can play CF, his market value is not going to go down. The Indians wouldn’t have gotten nearly as much for Coco Crisp (a low OPS LF at the time) if Boston didn’t think he could play CF (ignoring for a moment how badly that trade worked for all parties involved).
Fantastic article Jon and something I have been in your corner on since the beginning of the season.
However, as mentioned a couple times in these posts, I do not think the WAR devaluation is valid for Sizemore.
His agent is going to use the CF valuation regardless of where he plays and will claim he is a CF. His knee should be completely healthy by the time his contract is up, so his agent will use that as well.
If we trade Sizemore, I doubt it will be to a team that wants him for LF. As mentioned, he has more value at CF, so a team using him at CF will be more likely to give up a better deal.
Regardless, I think we do need Brantley in CF and Sizemore in LF. Now, where they bat in the lineup will be dependent on if Brantley can improve his numbers (obviously).
One last point on Brantley. With elite guys like Santana, Chis, and Alex White, I agree with those scribes saying to delay their arbitration clock. However, with guys like Brantley, I do not because he does need time to adjust and I want him to start his clock with the lower numbers. These lower numbers will make it more likely we can agree on something long term with him if we do see and believe in his progress.