Fausto’s New Face

If I were to ask you who the most valuable Indian was this season AND I told you that South Koreans were ineligible for this little game, what would you say?  It’s not really an easy question.  As Steve Buffum pointed out earlier this week, Choo leads the Indians in games played, plate appearances, hits, singles, doubles, home runs, RBI, total bases, walks, stolen bases—basically every counting stat except triples, which he trails by one.  Choo also leads the team in batting average, OPS, wOBA, slugging percentage, on-base percentage, WPA, WAR, wRC, blahdy, blahdy, blah.  He’s good.

But for this game, we’re leaving out Choo.  Why?  Well, because I said so.  Just trust me.  So who else is left?  Let’s look at the WAR leaderboard for the Indians just to get a feel if anyone has had a significant contribution:

I grabbed Fangraph’s WAR figures, but the only real difference in B-R’s WAR is that Masterson is significantly less valuable there for obvious reasons.

First of all, that is one depressing list.  Out of the ten “most valuable” players for the Indians this season, four play for other teams now, and one had serious knee surgery.*  Yikes.  Furthermore, Choo has contributed twice as many wins as his closest teammate.  Please stop calling him complementary.  Or complimentary.  Either way, stop it.  It’s not complimentary to do such a lousy thing.

*As an aside, are you as amazed by Carlos Santana as I am?  In 46 games he amassed more value than all but three players for the Indians.  At the time of his injury, his WAR—a counting statistic—was higher than Joe Mauer’s, a great player who had played in twice as many games.  That is remarkable production.

But keeping in mind my temporary moratorium on South Koreans, it looks like Fausto Carmona has probably been the second most valuable Indian this season.  It’s funny, his 2007 dominance seems so long ago, and for reasons we’ll discuss below, he really was a different pitcher then than he is now.

For the purposes of this article, I’m largely going to ignore 2008 and 2009, Fausto’s “lost seasons.”  It’s not that interesting developments didn’t take place during these seasons; they almost certainly did.  It’s just that what so many have been yearning for is a return to v2007 Fausto, and some believe that we’ve finally found it.

Let’s check out some basic numbers first:

Obviously, v2010 Fausto isn’t quite as good as v2007: he walks more guys this year, strikes out fewer, and consequently, his ERA is a bit higher in 2010 than in 2007 (though notice that his FIPs are similar).

But take a closer look at 2007: his FIP is nearly a full run higher than his ERA, suggesting that he had some luck on his side.  In 2007, Fausto stranded nearly 78% of baserunners, 12% more than league average.  This year it’s a more reasonable 70% strand-rate.  Fausto was also helped by a fairly low batting average on balls in play: .281 in 2007 compared to .299 for his career.

So is 2010 Fausto just getting less lucky?  Or is there something else at work?  After all, he is three years older (and wiser?)—he may have changed some fundamental delivery mechanism or pitch selection process over the last two years.  In fact, he almost certainly did.  Let’s take a look at what batters do when they put the ball in play against Fausto:

Fausto’s 64.3% groundball rate in 2007 led the AL; his closest competition was from Felix Hernandez who was barely over 60%.  Consequently, his flyball rate was the lowest in the league; again, Felix Hernandez was his closest competitor with a 23.1% flyball rate.  In other words, in 2007, no AL starter induced groundballs and eschewed flyballs quite the way that Fausto did.

You’ll notice that in 2010, those figures are dramatically different.  Fausto’s groundball rate dropped to only 55.2%—still above league average, but not otherworldly—while his flyball rate climbed above 30% for the first time in his career.

Somehow, though, Fausto isn’t letting up more home runs in 2010, even though he’s letting up far more flyballs.  He’s cut his HR/FB ratio significantly this season, keeping his HR/9 rate almost identical to his 2007 campaign.

Obviously, Fausto has become a different sort of pitcher: he let’s up more flyballs than ever before, fewer groundballs, while somehow maintaining fairly similar strikeout- and walk-rates.  Let’s look at a few more numbers, to see if we can put a finger on this change:

FB = fastball; SL = Slider; CH = changeup

In 2007, nearly 90% of the time, Fausto threw a fastball.  That is a preposterously high number.  It seems that he and the coaching staff trusted his sinking fastball so much (for good reason, it would seem) that they allowed him to, as the saying goes, just go out there and throw. Opposing hitters would beat it into the ground, and his defense would take care of the rest.*

*A league-leading groundball rate and a strong defensive infield are two complementary pieces.  The Indians would be wise to take this to heart for next season.

For some reason, that philosophy appears to have changed.  Fausto now throws his fastball about two-thirds of the time, increasing the use of both of his off-speed pitches dramatically—he didn’t even have a changeup in 2007, but now throws it about 15% of the time.  As the cliché goes, he’s started pitching and stopped throwing.

But why?  Why would a pitcher who had such success throwing his sinker begin to rely more heavily on other pitches?  He led the league in groundball rate, a remarkably smart thing for a pitcher to do.  Changing his pitch selection seems to have limited the ability that once made Fausto so special.  Why change?

Well, for one, 2008 happened.  And for another, 2009.  Hitters adjusted to Fausto’s sinking fastball, learning to lay off it as it dove out of the strikezone.  Fausto’s walk-rate in 2008 jumped to 5.22BB/9!  He had to change something.  And what he changed, while we were watching the implosions of the 2008 and 2009 seasons, was his pitch selection.

So no matter how similar some of his 2010 numbers may look to 2007, I would suggest that Fausto v2007 is gone.  What we have left is a useful guy, but not quite the same guy that we had before.  This one throws more than one pitch, for one thing.  But he’s also gone through some struggles, and come out on the other side.

It’s not entirely likely that Fausto will ever be as valuable as he was in 2007; he was a dominant force that season, overshadowed by Sabathia, but nearly as valuable.  But, in some ways, I think I’m ok with the new Fausto.  The Fausto we have now seems more balanced, more resilient, and savvier.  He seems capable of making in-game adjustments, and out-thinking his opponent, as opposed to just throwing that fastball over and over again, results be damned.

And what does any of this mean, going into next year?  Not a whole heck of a lot, really.  Fausto will likely be relied on heavily for this young staff, even though he’d probably be a middle- to back-of-the-rotation guy on a contender.

But he’ll be our ace, and I have to admit: I’m glad he’s learning how to pitch.