WFNY’s 2014 Cleveland Browns Position Review: Safeties
January 15, 2015Cardale Jones announces decision to stay at the Ohio State University
January 15, 2015Winter in Cleveland is not conducive to baseball. The unforgiving cold and unwieldy snow serve as a better backdrop to hockey or frostbite. While we shovel the driveway, Chris Antonetti and Mark Shapiro are working the phones to try and find the right players to boost the Cleveland Indians’ chances in a strong Central Division in 2015.
The two front office mates has taken a lot of flak from both fans and media over the past few years for trading favorite players and seemingly disregarding public opinion in personnel moves. But is that ill will warranted? We forget now that some of the current favorite, and award winning, players were acquired via shrewd trades.
With that, we take a look at a few of these moves in the past five years.
July 31, 2010
The Tribe is 42-61, 16.5 games out of first place, and sits dead last in the AL Central. Manny Acta is steering a 93 loss ship that is quite adrift from mediocrity. The team’s best pitcher is the hurler formerly known as Fausto Carmona who will finish the season with a team leading 13 wins. In other words, a change is necessary. In an effort to gain some young talent, Shaponetti arranges a three-team trade with the San Diego Padres and St. Louis Cardinals.
Cleveland sends RHP Jake Westbrook and cash to St. Louis
San Diego sends LHP Nick Greenwood to St. Louis
St. Louis sends OF Ryan Ludwick to San Diego
San Diego sends RHP Corey Kluber to Cleveland
I was sad to see Westbrook go. He was an All-Star in 2004 and had been with the club since 2001. Still during the 2010 campaign he was 6-7 with a 4.65 ERA and 4.64 FIP while making $11 million. Plus as a 32-year-old in his walk year there was little chance the Indians would repay him at the salary he would want. Westbrook would finish the season with St. Louis, resign with them as a free agent, then win a World Series ring with the Cardinals in 2011. He retired after the 2013 season.
Meanwhile the Indians picked up 24-year-old right-hander Corey Kluber. Between 2011 and 2013 Kluber pitched in 41 games for the Tribe going 13-10. In 2014 he absolutely exploded into the American League registering 18 wins against 9 losses, a 2.44 ERA, 2.35 FIP, and 269/51 strikeout-to-walk ratio. Oh, and he also won the American Cy Young award and his contract runs through 2019.
So while Klubot took a few years to get his wiring worked out I would argue that the Jake Westbrook trade worked out pretty well for both parties. Ryan Ludwick, by the way, played 160 total games for San Diego with a .228/.301/.358 slash line. So maybe the Friars got the short end of that stick.
Here are the major players’ WAR (Wins Above Replacement) in the intervening years:
Player | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
Jake Westbrook | -0.2 | 1.1 | -0.6 | n/a |
Corey Kluber | -0.1 | -0.5 | 1.4 | 7.4 |
July 30, 2011
The Tribe is 53-51 and has seen their seven game division lead disappear to a 1.5 game deficit. Cleveland is arguably overachieving with a roster that unapologetically includes Luis Valbuena and Lou Marson. For the first time in years Shaponetti considers themselves (itself?) a buyer at the deadline. The front office decides to steal the headlines by acquiring a dynamite pitcher.
Cleveland sends RHP Alex White, RHP Joe Gardner, RF Matt McBride, and PTBNL RHP Drew Pomeranz to Colorado
Colorado sends RHP Ubaldo Jimenez to Cleveland
Many Indians fans were pleased to see the Indians buying and even happier with the haul (some were not). The previous year Ubaldo won 19 games and was a National League All-Star. The front office hoped the big righty could help end the team’s mid-season slide. The results were…not great, honestly. Jimenez went 4-4 with a 5.10 ERA in 11 games. The Indians failed to reclaim their April heights, finished at 80-82, and likely played golf the first weekend in October. The bottom seemed to fall off in 2012 as Ubaldo went 9-17 with an ERA over 5.00. However, in September 2013 when the Indians needed to be nearly perfect to make the playoffs, Ubaldo Jimenez was the monster we had hoped for. He started six games in September 2013; he went 4-0 while striking out 51 batters in 41.1 innings. Cleveland won all six contests and returned to the postseason. Jimenez left the club that offseason and signed with Baltimore.
Colorado’s major pieces were Alex White and Drew Pomeranz. White appeared in 30 games for the Rockies with a 4-13 record and 6.30 ERA. An injury forced him out of the 2013 season, and he spent 2014 with the Houston Astros AAA affiliate in Oklahoma City. Pomeranz played for Colorado from 2011-2013. He was unremarkable for the Rockies going 4-14, 5.20 ERA, and 4.78 FIP. Before the 2014 season Colorado traded Pomeranz to the Oakland Athletics. Drew got into a groove with the A’s; he pitched in 20 games for the club, went 5-4 with a 2.35 ERA, and helped pitch the team into the playoffs. The pitchers are young (both are 26) so they may still develop into regular contributors, but so far neither has set the league on fire.
So was this trade worth it? A cynic may say it depends how much you enjoyed the first two innings of the 2013 AL Wild Card Game. In my opinion this one is a wash…for now. Jimenez frustrated me more than any pitcher in recent memory, but he was clutch when it counted. I don’t long for White or Pomeranz in Wahoo red, white, and blue, but I definitely wish them well.
WAR Comparison:
Player | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 |
Ubaldo Jimenez | -0.2 | -0.6 | 2.7 |
Alex White | -1.2 | 0.5 | n/a |
Drew Pomeranz | -0.1 | 1.4 | -0.1 |
November 3, 2012
If a trade falls in November and no one really notices, does it still make a difference? A resounding yes. Shaponetti outright fleeced Toronto in this deal.
Cleveland sends Esmil Rogers to Toronto
Toronto sends 3B Mike Aviles and C Yan Gomes to Cleveland
The Indians bought Rogers’ contract in June 2012. He appeared in 44 games for the Tribe that year sporting a 3-1 record and 3.06 ERA. The right-hander had a decent year, but bullpen arms are always moving so it was not major news when he was sent to Toronto.
The return on investment though is almost criminal. Mike Aviles and Yan Gomes made an immediate impact on the North Shore in 2013. “Handsome” Mike played six positions that year and was a terrific utility man. Yan Gomes is likely the star of this deal. The man Twitter calls #Yanimal had a fine turn as backup catcher in 2013. This past season he ensconced himself as the catcher of the present and future, both producing offensively and steering the pitching staff to a second half renaissance. He was a Silver Slugger award and his strong throws prevent base theft more than a neighborhood watch. This was certainly a coup for the Indians front office.
Player | 2013 | 2014 |
Esmil Rogers | 0.4 | -0.4 |
Mike Aviles | 0.3 | 0.3 |
Yan Gomes | 4.2 | 4.4 |
Mark Shapiro and Chris Antonetti are by no means perfect. Though these deals have worked out for the Indians for the most part there are plenty of pitchers they have not re-signed (Scott Kazmir) or favorites they let go who are still producing (Victor Martinez). Upon reviewing the path to the present, however, there is no denying the impact trades have made on the current roster. Hopefully as the snow continues to fall over the next few months, Antonetti and Shapiro continue to build the best team they can to last until the next snowfall in October.
36 Comments
“Mark Shapiro and Chris Antonetti are by no means perfect.”
No doubt. But I guess the moral is that blind squirrels do indeed find nuts.
Kluber’s minor league stats were unremarkable at best. Landing that guy (or the guy he became rather) was classic super lotto.
I like reading those comments on the Martinez trade. Man, people were upset. I looked it up and we were 17 games under .500 and 11 back for the division at the time of the trade.
So when they do something good, it’s luck. When they screw up, they’re showing their true colors. Got it.
No, I don’t think you did get it. I said landing the modern day Kluber was due to luck, so therefore it couldn’t be “when they do something good (well).”
So when there is a positive result, it is luck. The negative results are true indicators of the front office’s talent?
Also, I’m using good as a noun, meaning “something of worth or benefit”. When they take actions that result in worth or benefit for the team, it is luck?
I’m not sure that anyone is saying (other than you trying to put words in my mouth) they or their moves are defined by absolutes. Specifically to Kluber, I think that was by and large….luck. But to be fair, I think that they saw something they liked at least (in valuation for an aging Westbrook at the end of his contract), so they have to get some credit. Then again, they saw something they gushed over in Andy Marte, Drew Pomeranz, Alex White…ok can we forgo the parade of horribles and just stipulate they have been abysmal at drafting? So what does that tell us about their talent eval? I’m not sure exactly, but it isn’t great. But they’ve done “positive” things in signing foreign players and developing academies in the Caribbean. They recognized the potential in Gomes. They’ve done a great job in getting tremendous coaches like Mickey and a manager like Francona. They scored a big payday on STO. I don’t know…they seem like nice people and seem to care. They have good posture?
Terrible drafting and poor return on lower level prospects gained back in trades could point to an abysmal development system.
While our trading is better than most, our drafting might be worse than any. But, we also had a completely different draft philosophy until a few years ago (changing now to going after more high upside guys).
Except this team hits the “lotto” on seemingly underwhelming minor leaguers all. the. time. Their success in picking those guys is due to luck just as much as their drafting is due to luck. That is, an amount that we outsiders have no freaking clue about.
They’ve averaged about 88 wins a season the last two years.
All I know is that these guys have assembled a great deal of young, controllable talent. Yet when I point out they were smart enough to trade for Brantley and Carrasco, the line is – “They got lucky. Laporta and Knapp were busts.” The presiding wisdom seems to be to write off the successes off while presenting the failures as legitimate data that is representative of the front office’s talent. Which… I just don’t get. It seems completely dishonest.
EVERYONE on the roster is here because of them, good and bad. I’m more than willing to admit the mistakes they made. I don’t just say, “well, they were just unlucky.” No, they messed up and their evaluations weren’t very good, apparently. I’m just asking that critics do the same with the successes and not just hand-wave them away.
I’m done criticizing our draft. We had nine draftees play for the big league club last year, two of whom were regulars. Kipnis was an all-star the year before. When can we put that one to bed?
I’d also point out that the A’s will be entering 2015 as a top pick in the AL and they will field a major league roster with two, maybe three, draftees. Talent is talent, however you get it.
Look, you might have other beefs with other people…and I hear that not everyone is fair in their criticisms….but I can just speak for myself.
Carrasco I give them 100% credit on. He was their targeted man in that trade (yes, Donald and Knapp didn’t pan out but fine). Carlos had/has nasty stuff. However, Brantley (and this thing has been debated on this site before) was a throw in when the Brewers made the playoffs by the skin of their teeth. Laporta was their prize. So again with Brantley, it was a bit of luck (and yes, the talent eval to recognize him!)
I agree that talent is talent, but we need to see our ’08 and beyond drafts play out a bit more before I can tuck it in tightly for the night. Those Grant drafts are more promising overall, but are still yet to bear much fruit (largely due to us drafting younger upside guys, but that is why we wait).
Yeah, I don’t get either how people can come up with such a dichotomy in the team’s player acquisition. But I go pretty far the other way. So much of picking and developing young guys is luck. Figuring out what an 18 year old kid from Florida or 16 year old from the Dominican or even 21 year old college player is going to be like in 3-5 years is an almost impossible task – back in 2005, the experts couldn’t find more than a hair’s worth of difference between Crowe and Ellsbury. But a lot can happen on the way to the majors.
But Brantley wasn’t just any old throw in. He was the #2 guy they wanted in that deal. He wasn’t a name drawn out of a hat or deep from some scouts notebook. They had targeted him from the beginning.
Pro poker players, the guys who play AA instead of 27, get lucky every day of their life too. Yet most people don’t discount their ability to put themselves in the best possible situation possible as simple luck. The Indians have been smart enough to consistently acquire young talent with extremely high up size by doing the same.
Every baseball transaction involves luck. Luck to stay healthy. Luck to develop. Luck to not get in a car crash. So to pick one transaction, like Kluber or Brantely, and write it off as luck rings intellectually dishonest to me.
I’d love to get some clarity one day about their development thing – how much was the obscene failure over a decade to turn draftees into good major leaguers attributable to bad coaching v. a wrong-headed philosophy about how to draft position players? Hundreds of consecutive failures without a single success wasn’t “luck,” but it’s probably something we won’t have clarity about until Shapiro confesses the organizational sins in a retirement interview one day. He knows they were doing something really bad, because recent draftees have totally different profiles.
the issue is that if picking/developing guys is pure luck, then organizations like the Cardinals wouldn’t hit at such a drastically higher rate then the pre-08 Indians. those are the extremes at either end, but there is definitely more to it than luck.
Yeah you’re right…the development could be a causal link, not to be discounted. I think about Pomeranz. He was highly prized by the Indians, then was fizzling a bit, flipped for Ubaldo and then floundered in Colorado for a few years. And left for dead, last year he suddenly showed decent stuff with the As. Who knows? Maybe once a guy is “developed” and molded, he either makes it or fails….very few guys magically figure it out in the later 20s like Kluber or Cliff Lee.
I agree that luck plays a major factor in all this. Like I said below (or above, depending on your display), I’d compare it to poker. Yes, it’s about how the cards fall, but smart people realize that a correct process will put you in a place where win more than you lose.
KC’s Gordon another great example.
I agree with you both to a large extent. Yes, it’s a big of a crapshoot inherently, but the smart players do eventually win over time.
Sure, there’s a lot more to it than luck. I didn’t mean to suggest otherwise. But there is a ton of luck to it. Anyone who has been around teenagers enough to know that it’s impossible to guess what they’ll be like in a few days, much less a few years, has to accept how much of a crapshoot this process is.
no doubt, I think everyone agrees there. I think the arguments end up being the ratios of luck to skill.
Here’s my armchair theory, based on nothing, really. Well, based on my observations and some logical leaps….
I think the organization felt that amateur scouting was extremely difficult and very expensive. More importantly, other avenues for finding young talent were less expensive and offered a higher likelihood to produce talent. So rather than spend all that money and resources on a network of amateur scouts that, at best, are going to give you lottery ticket odds on finding a winner, the club decided to invest that money/effort in international scouting/development and minor league scouting, both of which provide certain advantages over amateur scouting (which I could go into if you really care). Because of this, I think philosophically the club looked to those two areas (abroad, trading for other teams prospects) to get high-ceiling talent and ultimately viewed the draft as a means to acquire low-ceiling, signable (aka cheap), more “pro-ready” guys (college grads over prep schoolers).
Where do you see these differences in profiles? From 2000 through 2007 they took guys all over the profile map. College pitchers, prep pitchers, guys who projected to be big corner bats, athletes who played up the middle. Since 2008? Well, pretty much the same all-over-the-map style.
But that ignores the 2000-2001 run on high-ceiling prep arms. Or splashing big cash on Guthrie.
My argument is more like this: luck is always an issue. To what extent, who knows. Because it is, it is unfair to write off successes as luck while holding the front office’s feet to the fire for failures (which were just as much influenced by luck). Can’t have it both ways. Yes, we got lucky that the Brewers made the playoffs which allowed us to get Brantley. But we also got unlucky when Laporta injured and suffered hip issues.
Well, I don’t think these were hard rules that could never be broken. I’m not even sure if they were rules at all. Maybe more general philosophies about the best way to acquire talent when all else is equal.
We’re humans. We look for patterns and narratives even when they’re not there. Helps us sleep at night.
Right. And I don’t know why we get so sucked into it (including myself here). We have no freaking clue how much these guys know about all the amateur talent or how confident they are in prep pitcher X over college hitter Y or vice versa. I think anyone who suggests they know which guy was “lotto” and which was a sign of “skill” is completely talking out of their rear. And that includes me when I do it.
Yeah, this is what I’m trying to get at, and completely agree with the pattern and narrative seeking angle. They certainly could have thought there was a competitive advantage to drafting college players or big bats, until that prep arm or amazing athlete fell to their pick. Then the rules get thrown out the window. They completely flubbed trying to make Crowe a 2B, but turned around and nailed it with Kipnis. I think even the best laid plans requires a lot of flying by the seat of your pants.
I feel like I’m all over the place on this, but it does intrigue me from a lot of different angles, as the public seems to know so little about how the sausage is made.
Yeah, it’s my No True Scotsman drafting philosophy hypothesis that’s always true except when it’s not.
I’ve often thought about sitting down and doing a thorough year-by-year review of our drafts in the Shapiro era. Were we really that bad at drafting? Are there any discernible patterns? Does the data suggest some sort of overarching philosophy? Was it bad luck? Ineptitude? Does the data support a change in organizational philosophy once Grant took over the draft?
I think it would be a mammoth undertaking though. And, knowing myself, I’d get so bogged down in the weeds that nothing would ever come of it.
I think as fair it is to say that Brantley was lucky, it is equally fair, if not moreso, to say that Laporta was unlucky. I’m sure they had done homework on both players but it was near unanimous that Laporta was a great get.
I’m still upset. Will never forgive them for that one. Victor should’ve retired an Indian.
Signing Rogers off the street, enjoying some success from him that year, then flipping him for Gomes and Aviles the next was a sequence of moves I really liked a lot.